We critically examine the policy reform agenda required to improve macro-…nancial stability.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to address whether monetary union a¤ects the growth process for member countries. While it is typically assumed that real variables (such as the level of output) should be una¤ected by monetary factors in the long run, it is possible that shortterm and medium-term output might be a¤ected by the nature of the monetary regime through a number of mechanisms. Moreover, if hysteresis mechanisms are operative, such temporary output losses may have permanent costs (Fatas 2000, De Long and Summers 2012) .
At the level of an individual member country, there are two types of misallocation that may harm growth performance. First, there may be a chronic/persistent misallocation by which an economy may have an inappropriate sectoral composition of output (tradables versus nontradables; investment in construction versus investment in machinery and equipment). Second, there may be acute/sharp intertemporal misallocations (spending levels too high relative to income levels) that result in a crisis, with an attendant post-crisis adverse impact on medium-term output Rogo¤ 2009, Romer and Romer 2015) .
The nature of a monetary union may foster both types of misallocation. There is considerable evidence that EMU increased the degree of cross-border …nancial integration among euro area member countries, especially in relation to external debt positions (Lane 2006 , Lane 2009 . In turn, …nancial integration facilitated an increase in the size and persistence of current account imbalances (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2001, Lane and Pels 2012) . Large-scale and persistent current account imbalances raise the likelihood of both the chronic and acute misallocation risks outlined above. In relation to chronic risks, surplus countries may see excessive growth in export-orientated sectors and insu¢ cient growth in domestically-orientated sectors, with the opposite pattern prevailing in de…cit countries. In relation to acute risks, external debt liabilities are a robust predictor of external crises (Catao and Milesi-Ferretti 2014) . While crises primarily a¤ect debtors, crises also adversely a¤ect creditor economies through wealth losses on external asset positions and trade channels.
In the other direction, international …nancial integration may also have positive e¤ects on output growth. First, cross-border net …nancial ‡ows may accelerate convergence, if capital is reallocated from capital-abundant economies to capital-scarce economies. Second, international risk sharing (through trade in equity-type instruments) may facilitate the selection of higher-return, higher-risk projects that generate faster (if more volatile) output growth (Obstfeld 1994) . Moreover, for a given level of output volatility, international risk sharing reduces the welfare costs of volatility by insulating wealth and consumption from domestic production shocks.
However, monetary union has had relatively little impact on cross-border equity positions relative to cross-border debt positions. Also, the scale and composition of current account imbalances in the mid-2000s are consistent with "ine¢ cient" imbalances that re‡ected excessive risk-taking by under-regulated national banking systems in some countries, over-investment in property assets (residential and non-residential) and delayed adjustment to adverse external shocks . Following Forbes and Warnock (2012) and Bruno and Shin (2014) , such domestic factors interacted with low global interest rates and "easy" …nancial conditions (as captured by the VIX and global liquidity indicators).
In addition to the direct impact of international …nancial integration, monetary union also alters the behaviour of important adjustment mechanisms. In particular, the absence of national currencies may make it more di¢ cult to accomplish stabilising shifts in the real exchange rate. In turn, lack of adjustment in the real exchange rate may increase the persistence of external imbalances and sectoral misallocations (for both surplus and de…cit economies). Going further, demand-type shocks may generate destabilising movements in the real exchange rate (and the real interest rate, since price level movements are typically persistent), with current account de…cits associated with real exchange rate appreciation and a decline in the real interest rate through a positive and persistent in ‡ation di¤erential.
However, in the other direction, it is also true that a monetary union o¤ers insulation against non-fundamental national-level exchange rate shocks. There is a sizeable literature emphasising the possible allocative ine¢ ciencies associated with ‡oating exchange rates, given the scope for speculative/noise shocks to shift currency values away from current fundamentals (see, amongst others, Berka et al 2012) . A concrete recent example is provided by Iceland: the sharp appreciation of the Icelandic krona in the mid-2000s was an aggravating factor during its boom phase. Accordingly, it is not clear ex ante whether monetary union would increase or decrease the e¢ ciency of the exchange rate adjustment mechanism (see also Lane 2010) . In similar vein, the limited scope for independent monetary policies in mitigating international …nancial shocks is emphasised by Rey (2013) .
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Along another dimension, conditional on a crisis occurring, membership of a monetary union provides a bu¤er through the operation of system-wide central bank liquidity mechanisms.
2 Through such cross-border liquidity ‡ows (as captured by Target 2 balances in the eurosystem), the immediate output consequences of a sudden stop in private capital ‡ows are mitigated. However, the existence of this bu¤er mechanism in turn may reduce private-sector incentives to maintain liquidity bu¤ers and increase risk-taking incentives by banks (Fagan and McNelis 2014) . Given these mixed e¤ects, whether monetary union increases or decreases the costs associated with external crises cannot be …rmly established on an ex ante basis.
Of course, at a broader level, the crisis exposed the inadequacy of crisis management tools in many countries. In particular, insu¢ ciently-capitalised banks and the absence of e¤ective bank resolution regimes raised the costs of crisis management. The high degree of cross-border …nancial linkages within the euro area meant that national-level banking 1 However, the degree of e¤ective monetary autonomy is certainly non-zero, as shown by Klein and Shambaugh (2013) 2 In relation to cross-border portfolio holdings, Galstyan and Lane (2013) also show that bond investors from outside the euro area were more likely to run for the exit during the crisis than were bond investors from fellow member countries.
policies had large area-wide spillover e¤ects, which interacted with spillovers between the euro area and the …nancial systems of other advanced regions. In related fashion, the emergence of a diabolic loop between domestic banking systems and domestic sovereigns made management of the emerging sovereign debt crisis yet more problematic. In overall terms, the crisis highlighted the ine¢ ciency of national banking policies in a common currency area, which also necessitated a clari…cation of the role of the eurosystem in underpinning area-wide …nancial stability. We return to the policy reform agenda in relation to …nancial integration and …nancial union in Section 3.
In terms of the contribution of this paper, we …rst examine the empirical evidence on whether membership of the euro area was associated with a shift in the cyclical behaviour of key macro-…nancial variables. If the euro has ampli…ed pro-cyclical patterns in these variables, it reinforces the importance of designing and implementing o¤setting stabilisation policies and ensuring that balance sheets are su¢ ciently resilient to absorb the impact of higher volatility. Our empirical strategy is to examine these issues in the context of the "initial phase"of EMU (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) and also the "crisis"phase (2008-2012/2014) . Second, we turn to the policy reform agenda in relation to improving macro-…nancial stability for the aggregate euro area and the individual member countries.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. We report our empirical work in Section 2. The policy agenda is discussed in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we conduct three empirical exercises. First, we examine whether membership of the euro area has been associated with di¤erent cyclical behaviour of selected (Bruno and Shin 2015) . Fourth, the evidence indicates that small open economies tend to deviate from Taylor-indicated interest rates in order to limit di¤erentials with the policy rates of the major central banks (Taylor 2013).
Accordingly, we take a more indirect approach by investigating whether monetary union has been associated with a shift in the cyclical behaviour of key macro-…nancial variables.
3 Estrada et al (2013) present related evidence but focus on di¤erent variables, a di¤erent comparator set of countries and di¤erent empirical methods. See also Giannone et al (2010) for related work on the characteristics of business cycles for members of the euro area. 4 Of course, output gap estimates for the pre-crisis period have been heavily revised on the basis on ex-post information.
We …rst report some empirical results in relation to whether the cyclical behaviour of macro…nancial variables has been di¤erent under EMU. In order to have a basis for comparison, we examine the member countries in the context of a wider group of 34 OECD countries for the both the pre-EMU and post-EMU periods.
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Over 1984-2013, we examine the following speci…cation
where X it is a macro-…nancial variable (in ‡ation, the real exchange, the current account balance and the …scal balance) or an international …nancial ‡ow variable (net debt ‡ows, net portfolio ‡ows, net other investment ‡ows and net FDI ‡ows), i is a country …xed e¤ect, t is a time …xed e¤ect, GROW it is the output growth rate, euro it is a dummy for membership of the euro area (taking the value 1 from 1999-2013) and noneuro it is a dummy for nonmembership of the euro area (taking the value 1 for 1999-2013).
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The parameter captures the cyclicality coe¢ cient between output growth and X it , while and capture any shifts in cyclicality from 1999 onwards for members of the euro area and non-members of the euro area respectively. It is necessary to allow the cyclicality coe¢ cient to change for even non-members of the euro area, since global factors may have altered the cyclical patterns in X it even in the absence of monetary union.
In terms of priors, we may expect to be positive for in ‡ation and the real exchange rate to the extent that ‡uctuations in output are driven by demand-type shocks. Such shocks mean that surges in growth are associated with upward pressure on wages and prices. In the absence of countervailing poliy measures, this will result in positive comovement patterns 5 The country list is: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 6 We also examined an alternative sample interval 1984-2007. These results are available upon request.
between output growth and in ‡ation and the real exchange rate. Similarly, demanddriven output ‡uctuations should be associated with a negative value for in relation to the current account balance, with increases in domestic demand boosting imports. The prediction for the …scal balance is ambiguous: if membership of the euro area induces more …scal prudence, we may expect a positive value for ; whereas, if it induces less-disciplined …scal policies (for instance, due to the breaking of the link between national …scal balances and countervailing actions by the monetary authority), we would observe a negative value for . In relation to the international …nancial ‡ow variables, a procyclical pattern in net debt in ‡ows may be viewed as a risk-enhancing pattern, whereas a procyclical pattern in net equity-type in ‡ows might be a risk-mitigating pattern. Table 1 shows the results for in ‡ation, the real exchange rate, the current account balance and the …scal balance, while Table 2 shows the results for various categories of international …nancial ‡ows. It turns out that membership of the euro area (compared to the pre-EMU period and the comparator group of non-member countries) is associated with a signi…cantly di¤erent cyclical pattern for only two variables: in ‡ation and net international portfolio ‡ows.
In relation to the former, in ‡ation has been relatively more procyclical for the member countries. This is consistent with a pattern of demand-type shocks that induce both faster growth and local in ‡ation pressures. In relation to the latter, the negative estimated value of indicates that faster output growth for member countries was associated with greater net portfolio in ‡ows, which is a destabilising pattern. Otherwise, we do not observe in the data any euro-speci…c shift in the relation between output growth and this set of macro…nancial variables. In this limited sense, it seems that the euro did not amplify cyclical risks along most dimensions.
Next we perform an intra-group comparison by asking whether deviations in output growth among the member countries were associated with procyclical behaviour in a range of macro-…nancial variables. Procyclical patterns in these variables might be interpreted as contributing to an ampli…cation of national business and …nancial cycles within the euro area.
We run speci…cations of the following format
where the inclusion of time dummies means that captures the covariation between the growth deviation for country i in year t and the deviation in variable Z for country i in year t, relative to the area-wide common patterns in growth and variable Z. The sample period is 1999-2013. 7 We consider a wide range of macro-…nancial variables: (i) the growth rate of private consumption; (ii) the growth rate of private investment; (iii) the growth rate of government absorption (consumption plus investment); (iv) the …scal balance; (v) the current account balance;(vi) the log change in the real e¤ective exchange rate; (vii) the CPI in ‡ation rate;
(viii) the GDP de ‡ator in ‡ation rate; (ix) the change in the ratio of domestic credit to GDP; (x) net international debt ‡ows; (xi) net international equity ‡ows; and (xii) net FDI ‡ows. Tables 3-6 show the results. All speci…cations include time dummies but we consider both pooled and …xed e¤ects estimates. The former speci…cation takes into account the information in cross-country variation in the data, whereas the latter speci…cation focuses on within-country variation. In Table 3 , the pooled estimates indicate that countries that grow more quickly in a given year typically experience faster investment growth but slower growth in private consumption and government absorption, while running a more positive current account balance. The only systematic within-country pattern is that an increase in a country's growth rate is associated with faster investment growth. Table 4 shows that domestic in ‡ation (both consumption and GDP de ‡ator indices)
is signi…cantly positively associated with output growth in both the pooled and within- 7 We also examined an alternative sample interval 1984-2007. These results are available upon request.
country estimates. This is a destabilising pattern in that, holding …xed the area-wide policy interest rate, an increase in the expected in ‡ation rate implies a decline in the real interest rate, which further boosts demand. 8 However, it turns out that the real e¤ective exchange rate is orthogonal to the growth rate, which can be explained by the dominant role of the external value of the euro in driving the real e¤ective exchange rates of member countries.
We turn to the evolution of the …scal balance and domestic credit growth in Table 5 .
The …scal balance shows a stabilising pattern: faster output growth is associated with a larger …scal surplus. 9 Domestic credit growth is signi…cantly procyclical, which underlines the importance of macroprudential policies in ensuring macro-…nancial stability. We examine net international …nancial ‡ows in Table 6 . 10 While net FDI ‡ows are orthogonal to output deviations, positive output deviations are associated with signi…cantly larger net portfolio in ‡ows. Again, this is a destabilising pattern to the extent that these portfolio in ‡ows contribute to domestic asset price dynamics and domestic credit growth.
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Finally, we examine whether the nature of external adjustment in the aftermath of the crisis has been di¤erent for members of the euro area. In one direction, the inability to adjust nominal exchange rates at a national level may have constrained the external adjustment processs; in the other direction, access to cross-border eurosystem liquidity ‡ows (as captured by Target 2 imbalances) may have cushioned the required scale of adjustment.
For this exercise, the sample consists of 64 advanced and emerging economies. Milesi-Ferretti (2012, 2015) examined cross-country variation in external adjustment 8 In ‡ation di¤erentials tend to be persistent so an increase in in ‡ation in one period is associated with an increase in expected in ‡ation. 9 If output growth is driven by the …nancial cycle, the scale of surpluses required to ensure a stabilising pattern may be larger, given the procyclical nature of revenue streams generated by asset price booms and high construction investment. 10 We exclude Ireland and Luxembourg, since the …nancial ‡ow data for these countries are plagued by interpretation problems in relation to the mutual fund sector. 11 See also Lane and McQuade (2014) and Carvalho (2014 
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. A country running an excessive pre-crisis surplus is marked by a positive CAGAP value and a country running an excessive pre-crisis de…cit is marked by a negative CAGAP value. Table 7 shows the largest CAGAP values for the advanced economies in the sample. It is clear that excessive imbalances were not con…ned to members of the euro area.
In order to assess whether membership of the euro area a¤ected the external adjustment process in the wake of the crisis, we run speci…cations of the following format
where Z it is a macro-…nancial variable that is typically associated with external adjustment, CAGAP 0508 is the measure of "excessive" pre-crisis current account imbalances and euro i is a dummy for membership of the euro area. 13 We examine adjustment in: (i) the current account balance; (ii) the real exchange rate; (iii) domestic demand; (iv) output; (v) in ‡a-tion; (vi) the …scal balance; (vii) the stock- ‡ow adjustment term in the net international investment position (a proxy for international valuation e¤ects; (viii) export volumes; (ix) import volumes; and (x) domestic credit growth. 12 The empirical model includes widely-employed covariates such as demographic variables, the level of development, the …scal balance and correction factors for …nancial crises. 13 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) Tables 8 and 9 show the results. Up to 2012, external adjustment has typically involved a closing of excessive current account imbalances, with those countries with negative current account gaps entering the crisis experiencing greater declines in domestic demand, output and import volumes. As highlighted by Milesi-Ferretti (2012, 2015) , there was no cross-country correlation between current account adjustment and the real exchange rate up to 2012, so that the overall pattern for excessive-de…cit countries is that of adjustment through "expenditure reduction"rather than "expenditure switching."
In relation to the di¤erential experience of the euro area, the interaction term between CAGAP and the euro dummy is not signi…cant except for the real exchange rate and in ‡ation regressions. In relation to the latter, the evidence does support some role for intra-area adjustment: in ‡ation has declined by more over 2009-2012 (relative to 2005-2008) for those member countries with the most negative CAGAP values. However, in the other direction, these countries experienced the smallest real exchange rate depreciations.
This con…guration can be reconciled by di¤erences in trade patterns across the member countries. Still, the broad message from Tables 8-9 is that membership of the euro area has not substantially altered the external adjustment pattern relative to a broader sample of advanced and emerging economies.
14 Next, we consider an extended speci…cation
where BELL i is a dummy that takes the value 1 for the group of new member states that pegged to the euro (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). This is a relevant comparison group, since these countries were bound by the peg to the euro but did not have access to eurosystem liquidity facilities.
15 Tables 10 and 11 show the results. Relative to the BELL group, high-de…cit members of the euro area experienced a less severe adjustment in the current account balance and a smaller compression in trade volumes. In this limited sense, it seems as if the cross-border liquidity support provided by the eurosystem facilitated a gentler form of adjustment.
In summary, the pattern in Table 1 -6 is that the covariation between the output cycle and the …nancial cycle (as captured by domestic credit growth, net portfolio in ‡ows and variation in national-level real interest rates) grew more intense under EMU. As shown in Tables 8-11 in relation to external adjustment, this proved costly since the macro-…nancial costs of closing excessive current account imbalances in the wake of the crisis have been severe. 16 These cyclical patterns and the crisis experience have generated a wide-ranging policy debate about macro-…nancial stabilisation under EMU. We turn to this debate in the next section.
Policy Reforms
The high costs associated with resolving excessive external imbalances and recovering from …nancial crises have underlined the importance for all economies of maintaining macro…nancial stability and improving the resilience of the real economy and the …nancial system to large-scale shocks. The absence of national currencies makes these issues even more acute for members of the euro area.
15 See also Gross and Alcidi (2013) . Of course, there are also other important di¤erences between this group and members of the euro area (level of GDP per capita, country size, importance of foreign-owned banks). 16 Tables 8-11 also show that the adjustment experience has not been markedly di¤erent for euro area member countries relatively to a broad comparator group and has been somewhat gentler than the sudden stop experienced by the BELL group.
At a national level, there are three main challenges. First, macroprudential regulation of the …nancial system has the potential to mitigate …nancial risks. However, this is no easy task and is made more di¢ cult by the rise of shadow banking and shifts in …nancial activity towards non-regulated sectors. In addition, the scope for cross-border spillovers and leakages in relation to macroprudential policies means that appropriate coordination through the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is essential.
Second, …scal policy should at the same time both maintain long-term sustainability while also contributing to macroeconomic stability by moving counter-cyclically against both the output cycle and …nancial cycle (Calmfors 2003, Benetrix and . To this end, it is necessary that the European …scal framework be intelligently interpreted to enable the attainment of these twin goals.
Third, national legal and …nancial systems and domestic labour markets should be designed to tolerate inter-sectoral reallocations. For smooth adjustment, the capital ratios and credit policies of banks should be su¢ ciently resilient to absorb losses in declining sectors while funding new lending in expanding sectors; bankruptcy and debt restructuring should be e¢ ciently processed by the legal system; and labour market institutions should be capable of facilitating separations between workers and …rms in contracting sectors and new matches in expanding sectors.
At the European level, there has been considerable progress in setting up bank recovery and resolution plans and important elements of banking union, including the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the initiation of a Single Resolution Fund.
Still, a full-scale banking union requires further progress in developing a robust harmonised area-wide deposit insurance scheme and ensuring a joint …scal backstop (Marzinotto et al 2011) .
The stability of the European banking system would be further assured by reforms that limit excessive holdings of domestic sovereign bonds by banks (see also European Systemic Risk Board 2015). Brunnermeier et al (2011) and Corsetti et al (2015) highlight the bene…ts of a multi-country diversi…cation requirement in the sovereign bond portfolios held by banks. Furthermore, a pooled bundle of sovereign bonds could be divided into senior and junior tranches, with the senior tranche constituting an area-wide safe asset.
As argued by Corsetti et al (2015) , these senior tranche bonds could become the main instrument for eurosystem liquidity operations and quantitative easing programmes. The eurosystem could help develop the market for this security by stipulating that only these types of securities can achieve the highest rating in relation to risk weighting of assets and the calculaton of liquidity coverage ratios. In turn, if the links between banks and national government are weakened, the growth of pan-European banks will be encouraged. Through geographical diversi…cation, such banks are more likely to be robust in the event of regional shocks.
In addition, the dilution of bank exposures to any individual sovereign also mean that it will be more feasible in the future to allow for sovereign debt restructuring if a national government loses market access (Corsetti et al 2015) . International Monetary Fund (2014) provides a useful guide to the criteria that could be used to determine the role of sovereign debt restructuring (as a precursor to any o¢ cial funding) in a given situation. The lending framework of the ESM should be aligned with these criteria.
The scope for international risk sharing can also be improved by the types of reforms envisaged under the Capital Markets Union (CMU) initiative. Deeper and more integrated corporate bond and asset-backed securities markets can provide extra cushioning relative to a bank-dominated credit system, while the integration of equity markets and the market for corporate control (by fostering higher FDI ‡ows) can improve the equity-debt mix in crossborder ‡ows. At the same time, it is important to design policy frameworks so that growth in non-bank debt markets does not damage the capacity of macroprudential regulation to tackle excessive credit growth.
The crisis has also posed challenges for the conduct of monetary policy by the ECB.
Working out the appropriate roles of eurosystem liquidity policies and national-level Emer-gency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) in stabilising distressed national banking systems (especially in the context of simultaneously-distressed sovereigns) has been an ongoing challenge for the eurosystem. In similar vein, the e¤ectiveness of interest rate policies was compromised by the fragmentation of the interbank markets during the crisis and compromised state of bank balance sheets in many member countries. Most severely, speculation about redenomination risk induced elevated spikes in sovereign bond yields for a number of member countries.
Through the 2012 announcement of the OMT programme and 2014-2015 adoption of large-scale asset purchase programmes, the ECB has addressed uncertainty about the degree of its commitment to meeting its in ‡ation target and supporting …nancial stability in Europe. Given the limitations of conventional and unconventional monetary policies at the "near zero" lower bound, the desirability of revising upwards the in ‡ation target warrants debate. While this debate is also relevant for other major central banks, it has special relevance for the euro area in view of the desirability of facilitating adjustment of real exchange rates within the euro area.
In relation to …scal policy, national …scal policies should be embedded in an area-wide aggregate …scal position that is appropriate for the broad macroeconomic environment.
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To this end, further reform of the European …scal process may be necessary. In particular, the …rst stage of the European Semester could be devoted to determining the appropriate aggregate …scal position for the euro area, with national …scal plans subsequently framed to ensure that the aggregate position is achieved while also ensuring that national …s-cal positions are sustainable. To support this two-step process, the establishment of an 17 In this paper, I do not explore the scope for a larger-scale …scal union that would involve cross-border net …scal transfers in response to asymmetric shocks. The degree of political integration required for a large-scale …scal union does not seem imminent. In any event, if the reforms discussed in this paper are implememted, the scope for large-scale asymmetric shocks (which have primarily emerged from the …nancial system) should be sharply curtailed.
independent, non-political European Fiscal Council could be helpful in formulating the appropriate area-wide aggregate …scal position.
In principle, European-level surveillance of macro-…nancial risks may also be helpful in order to avoid national-level group think problems and reconcile the aggregate implications of diverse trends across the member economies. 18 While the European Union's Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) spans a wide range of relevant national-level macro-…nancial risk factors, country-level risk analysis should be embedded in a broader framework that is capable of providing a coherent account of area-wide risk. While an EU framework has been established to monitor …nancial stability risks through the ESRB, there is no similar institutional arrangement to monitor broader macroeconomic risks.
Finally, high legacy debt levels in a number of member countries make it more di¢ cult to implement the range of reforms outlined in this section, even if debt servicing problems are certainly less acute at current low interest rates. Corsetti et al (2015) outline a range of options to alleviate the burden of high debt levels, in order to support the transition to a safer, more stable euro area.
Conclusions
This paper has examined whether monetary union has been associated with a shift in the cyclical behaviour of an array of national-level macro-…nancial variables. In common with other advanced economies, the euro area experienced a major …nancial boom-bust cycle during 2003-2010. Along several important dimensions, this cycle was more severe within the euro area.
The failure to implement su¢ ciently countercyclical macroprudential and …scal policies during the boom phase was costly, as was the absence of e¤ective area-wide crisis management institutions once the crisis emerged. While there has been considerable progress in 18 Lunn (2013) provides an insightful account of decision-making biases during the Irish credit boom.
remedying these policy and institutional failures, much remains to be done, with the recent Five Presidents's Report outlining the range of reforms required to ensure a more robust monetary union. Whether Europe has the political appetite to implement these reforms is a major question for the coming years. Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* denote signi…cance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. is the in ‡ation rate; RER is the log change of the real e¤ective exchange rate; CAB is the …rst di¤erence of the current account balance scaled by GDP. F B is the …rst di¤erence of the …scal balance scaled by GDP; GROW is the percentage change of GDP at constant prices; euro is a dummy that equals one if a country is member of the euro area and zero otherwise; neuro is a dummy that equals one if a country is not member of the euro area during its existence and zero otherwise; LDV is the lagged dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* denote signi…cance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. FDI is the …rst di¤erence of net FDI out ‡ows scaled by GDP; PORT is the …rst di¤erence of net portfolio out ‡ows scaled by GDP; DEBT B is the …rst di¤erence of net other investment out ‡ows scaled by GDP; DEBT T is the …rst di¤erence of net debt out ‡ows scaled by GDP. Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* denote signi…cance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. GROW is the percentage change of GDP at constant prices; C is the deviation of private consumption from the euro area aggregate; I is the deviation of private investment from the euro area aggregate; G is the deviation of government spending from the euro area aggregate; CAB is the deviation of the current account balance from the euro area aggregate. All variables are scaled by GDP. Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* denote signi…cance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. GROW is the percentage change of GDP at constant prices; RER is the deviation of the log change of the real exchange rate from the euro area aggregate; is the deviation of the consumer price index from the euro area aggregate; Y is the deviation of the log change of the GDP de ‡ator from the euro area aggregate. Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* denote signi…cance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. GROW is the percentage change of GDP at constant prices. FB is the deviation of the the …scal balance from the euro area aggregate; DC is the log change in domestic credit. Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* denote signi…cance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. GROW is the percentage change of GDP at constant prices. PORT N is the deviation of net portfolio out ‡ows from the euro area aggregate; FDI N is the deviation of net FDI out ‡ows from the euro area aggregate. All dependent variables are scaled by GDP. 
